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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES L. BARKER, JR., TRUSTEE
IN THE J\IATTER OF GEORGE RAY
DUNHAM, VOLUNTARY
BANKRUPT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

-vs.-

9012

GEORGE R. DUNHAM AND LEODA_
DUNHAM, HIS WIFE,
Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION FOR REI-IEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
PETITION FOR REHEARING

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH:
GEORGE R. DUNHAM and LEODA DUNHAM,
defendants and respondents, respectfully request a rehearing in the above-entitled cause upon the following
grounds:
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POINT I.
THE COURT HAS MISINTERPRETED THE RE.CORD.
POINT II.
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO FOLLOW PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING EQUITY APPEALS.
POINT III.
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS FINDINGS
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

Respondents respectfully submit that on each of the
above grounds, the error of this court was decisive in its
decision reversing the trial court.
CLYDE & MECHAM
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
Attorneys for Respondents
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
POINT I.
THE COURT HAS MISINTERPRETED THE RE.CORD.

Under equity rules, this Court is entitled to examine
the evidence and to determine both factual and legal
matters on appeal. This Court in so doing has made
completely new findings of fact, contrary to those of the
trial court. In this re-exmnina tion, however, this Court
has misinterpreted the testimony of Leoda Dunham. The
only procedure which Respondent now has for pointing
out this error is by a Petition for Rehearing, wherein
the Court will have the opportunity to re-evaluate the
evidence.
This Court has found that the defendants' witnesses,
attorney LaMar Duncan, Thomas Lefler, Cashier of the
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Kamas State Bank, and also Leoda Dunham, defendant,
have testified falsely with reference to the execution of
the deed. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court
strongly relies upon the alleged testimony that Leoda
Dunham placed the property in joint tenancy because of
her serious illness, that she, therefore, knew of the legal
effects of joint tenancy and would have no reason fl)r
placing the property in her own name. SUCH IS NOT
A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF TH~J
RECORD.
The relevant paragraph of the Court's op1n1on 1s
quoted below with the incorrect fact statements italicized:
"A very strong reason for believing that the
deed was made after the accident and not at the
time it is dated is the fact that there is no reason
whatever shown for making such a deed at the
ttt'me. it was dated. This is equally true whether
or not her claim is correct that she paid for the
property out of her own separate funds. For until
the accident in which the creditors were imjured
occurred there was no reason for making the
transfer and none has been suggested. She
testified that although she. paid for the property
out of her own separate. funds, she had it conveyed to her and her husband jointly because (1)
she had ulcers of the stomach and vf anything
happened to her she wan~ed him to get the property; (2) it is customary for husband and wife to
hold their property as joint tenants; and (3) she
had no head for real estate so she turned it ove'r
to htt"m, and the fact that he was drinking heavily
at that time gave her no concern. The fact that
she said she placed the property tt"n joint tenancy
so he would get i't if anything happened to her
indicates that she knew that the survivor of joint
tenants would get the property on the death of
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the other. If his heavy drinking was no concern
to her, and she felt it safe to put her property in
joint tenancy with him, then there was no reason
to have him deed the property back to her merely
because he had a heart attack. Because if he died,
she knew that as a joint tenant she would become
the sole owner of the property upon his death.
The only excuse she gives for making this deed
was her fear that he would have a heart attack
and die. She does not claim that she had any fear
that his drinking might cause an accident and
make him liable to creditors, or that he might
wrongfully encumber the property. So under her
own understanding of joint tenancy there was no
occasion whatever for making the deed to her at
that time."
To the contrary, the only evidence is Leoda
Dunham's testimony to the effect that she had the property placed in George Dunham's name alone because of
her illness. I quote below the applicable portions of the
record: (R. 64, 65)
"DIRECT EXAMINATION, cont'd.
"By Mr. Cassity:

"Q. Mrs. Dunham, isn't it true that before the
referee in bankruptcy that you testified that
the uniform real estate contract under which
you first took the property from Mrs.
Kirkpatrick was placed in your husband's
nmne, Mr. Dunham, alone, no other name
being on it~
"A. I don't re1ne1nber that issue coming up about
the real estate contract.
"Q. Do you ren1ember, :.Mrs. Dunhmn, stating
that-upon being questioned that the reason
you had it put in your husband's name at
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that time and his name alone was that you
were ill~
"A.

I remember telling you down there that I
was ill.

"Q. And did you state that - further that your
illness consisted of bad ulcers~
"A.

That's right.

"Q.

Now, do you remember that you did put it
in your husband's name alone originally~

"A.

If I did, it was because of my illness at that
time. I was very ill with ulcers at that time.

"Q.

So that when it was originally purchased,
your husband's name alone was on the contract of sale. Is that not true~

"A.

Well, I don't know for sure whether it was
or not, it has been so long, but I know that
I was sick, and if his name was on there
alone, that would be the reason for it.

"Q. Do you remember this question being asked :
'What was the reason the title was put in
your husband's namef And your answer
said, 'I had ulcers of the stomach, and I was
very ill f
"A. I remember that, yes.
"Q. Do you remember the question, 'Did your
physician expect those ulcers to be fatal f
And you said, 'I don't know. I didn't know
at any time what would happen. I was really
sick~'

"A.

That's right.

"Q. And then you were asked, 'How long were
you ill~' And you answered, 'I still have
them ever since 1929 continuously since that
period~'
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"A.

That's right.

"Q. Do you have any other explanation for
putting the property in his name after it
was purchased alone the first time 1
"A. No Sir."
(R. 67, 68)
" ... Q. Now, going to that experience wherein
that took place, I refer you gack to this
question that was asked which you said
was your answer that you had very bad
ulcers back in 1929, and that was the reason
you put the property in Mr. Dunham's name
in the first place and that you have had very
bad ulcers ever since.
"A. Yes, they had been bad but not nearly as bad
as they were before because I have watched
my diet considerable.

"Q. I see, Now, did anybody ever explain to you
what joint tenancy means 1
"A. Well, not fully, no.

"Q. Do you have any reason why the property
was taken from your husband's name and
put in your name and his name? Did you
have some reason for that that you can
recollect?
"A. Well, no, not other than that I was ill. That's
the only reason that I remember, and that
he was n1ore capable of doing it probably
than I was at that ti1ne.
"Q. I arn speaking of the time when the property
was put in both your names, taken from
his to both your names.
"A. Will you repeat the question?
"Q. Pardon?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"A.

Will you repeat the question then, please. I
misunderstood.

"Q. Do you remember what your reason was for
doing that~
"A. What my reason was for having it in joint
tenancy~

"Q. Yes.
"A. The only reason I can say is I think it is
customary for husband and wife to have
those things done in their two names isn't
it~ I have always understood. I know my
mother and father used to anything like that
they have.
"Q.

Now, what was the reason that you put the
property from both names into just your
name~

"A.

Mr. Dunham's illness.

"Q. And what did that have to do with
"A.

it~

Well, he was-he has a very bad heart, and
be blacked out several times. In fact, one
Sunday he blacked out several times, and he
was under surveillance of the doctors, under
Doctor Nuttall, and he had frequent heart
attacks, blacked completely out.

"Q. Did this worry you with respect to the property~

"A.

Yes, it did."

Therefore, it is very clear and uncontradicted that
Leoda Dunham had the property placed in her husband'g
name originally in 1944 because of her serious illness.
It was later placed in joint tenancy in 1951 because she
thought it customary to have property in the name of
the husband and wife, since that was how her mother
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and father held their property. She then had it transferred to herself alone and out of the joint tenancy
when she believed that George's death was near. In
other words, one reaches an exactly opposite conclusion
from that of the Court. There was a reason to have the
property placed in her name in 1952, i.e., George's
possible death, which reason was consistent with her
reason for putting the property in George's name alone
in 1944.
The statements I have italicised in the Court's
opinion are not supported by the evidence and the Court
should not reasonably infer that Leoda Dunham knew
she would become the sole owner of the property under
a joint tenancy upon the death of George. She had no
such understanding of joint tenancy and, the Court erred
in so holding. Should we not, therefore, rely upon the
evidence set forth in the record as heard and observed
by the trial judge~ If this Court's "strong reason" for
disbelieving the defendants' witnesses is now abandoned,
there is no basis for the Court's opinion. There certainly
is clear and convincing evidence that the deed was executed. It is not equitable to deprive Leoda Dunham of her
property upon such a n1isinterpretation of the evidence.
Again on Page 3 of its opinion, the Court relies upon
a rnissappraisal of the record, by stating in the third
paragraph:
"ShortlY after the deed fr01n 1\Ir. Dunham to
l\frs. Dunha~n was recorded on November 27,1953,
another rnortgage was n1ade by the Dunhams to
the bank, dated April 1:2, 195±. In this mortgage
her name is first, and onl~T :Mrs. Dunham signed
this mortgage. No reason w·hatever is given why
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the cashier of the bank took a mortgage from Mr.
Dunham with his name appearing first on the
mortgage at a time when he knew that he had
deeded away all of his interest in the property.''
Contrary to this statement, the record, at Page 97,
98, shows the following:
"Q.

Now, just a moment. Didn't you say that
Mr. and Mrs. Dunham signed this mortgage1

"A. Yes.
"Q.

Now you are saying that you loaned it to
~irs. Dunham~

"A. The property at that time was in both names.
"Q. Did you see the-yes. Now, who did you loan
the money to~
"A. Well, I loaned it to Mrs. Dunham. She generally does all the speaking.
"Q. Is she the only wife of all the husbands and
wives that deal with you that deal for the
husband~

"A. Many of the wives do.
"Q.

Then how is it that you think you loaned the
money to Mrs. Dunham when you made both
of them sign the mortgage~

"A. Because I have to have both of them sign
the mortgage at that time when it was in
both names.
"Q. But you think you loaned the money to Mrs.
Dunham~

"A. Yes sir. She was the spokesman. I don't
know what they did before they came, but
she does all the talking when she comes into
the bank.
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"Q. Now, Mr. Lefler, you say that you understand - you understood that though you
loaned the money after both of them signed
the mortgage, you understood that they had
a deed which put the property in Mrs. Dunham's name~
"A. I knew of it, yes. She had told me of it.

"Q. Did you see it?
"A. No..."

(R. 100, 101)

"

. Q. In other words, simply because she
claimed she owned the property didn't disturb you~

"A. I follow the records of the county.
"Q. So you didn't rely on her statements?
"A. Not necessarily. If our attorney gives us
his opinion that the title is clear and corresponds with our note, that is all we ask for.

"Q. Now, let me ask another question. You prepared a mortgage a month or so before the
accident which both Mr. and Mrs. Dunham
executed, the property being found by your
abstracter to be in the names of both. Is
that true?
"A. That's right.

"Q. Then just a matter of a few months after
that when the property was recorded in the
name of one of the parties, you executed a
new mortgage which again you had both
parties sign. \Vhat was the reason for that~
"A. As I stated before, we had them sign because
we don't want to take any chance of any
prior lien that Inay be in the case of the
husband, although the wife does have the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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right to own property. Many cases we have
the husband sign.

"Q. Yes, but you have already pointed out that
he had already signed. What was the purpose in him signing twice~
"A. What I say, we recorded this new one to
bring it in line with the records of the county.
"Q. And you wanted a new mortgage after the
new deed had been recorded. Is that it~
"A. Yes.

"Q. But you still wanted Mr. Dunham to sign

it~

"A. We had him sign it, yes, for our protection.. "
The record, at Page 105, shows the following:

" ... Q. Well, now, Mr. Lefler, isn't it contrary
to your practice as a bank official to have
somebody come to you and ask for a mortgage and tell you that the property is
recorded in two names but actually belongs
to another person, one of those two persons
individually, is that your practice to loan
money under those circumstances~
"A.

It's-can I answer that in my own

way~

"Q. Yes, please.
"A.

In approaching individuals for loans, we
take the application, we submit it to the
attorney and abstractor, they determine
whose name the property has and is recorded. Then it comes back to us with that
information. We proceed, and we get the
mortgage with those signatures, those people
giving the mortgage.

"Q. In other words, it doesn't matter whether
the applicant for the loan told you - you
answer this 'yes' or 'No' - it doesn't matter
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to you what they tell you; the only thing
you go by is by the record. Is that true?
"A. Both.

"Q. Weren't you concerned at all about her telling you that it was her property alone when
you loaned her this money~
"A.

I think we are protected by the records of
the county.

"Q. So you weren't concerned then. Is that it?
"MR. PRA·T·T: I object to that, Your
Honor.
"A. I don't remember.
"MR. PRATT:
testified to.

That is not what he

"MR. CASSITY: I am asking him to
say 'Yes' or 'No'. He didn't answer my
question.
"THE COURT: I think he can answer
it 'Yes' or 'No'.

"Q. Were you or weren't you?
"A.

We are always, yes, we are concerned, sure.

"Q. Why did you loan the money if you were
concerned~

"A.

I don't recall the details of it, but I do know
that I checked with the abstracter. If it was
her's or whose it was or both of them signed
at that ti1ne, it would be all right... "
Mr. Lefler testified above to the effect that he relied
upon the record ti tie, \Yhich procedure was and is well
accepted as a n1atter of proper legal and practical dealing
wjth real propert)~. Also, he testified in the answer to
the last question above, to the effect that whether it was
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her's or George's property by reason of the unrecorded
deed, both had signed the mortgage and it was, therefore
proper. In view of this testimony, it is not reasonable for
this court to say that "no reason whatever" is given
for Mr. Lefler's action in handling the mortgage transaction in this manner.
The foregoing n1isinterpretations of the evidence,
i.e., the joint tenancy problem and the mortgage problem,
are major joints of reliance by this Court in rendering
its opinion This incorrect factual basis should not and
cannot exist as an equitable foundation for an opinion,
which deprives Leoda Dunham of her property. For this
reason and because there are additional errors in the
record citation, this Court should reconsider this case
and the evidence. This rehearing is the only procedure
available to Petitioners whereby review can be had of
this Court's alleged errors in its equitable fact :finding.
POINT II.
THE COURT HAS FAILED TO FOLLOW PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING EQUITY APPEALS.

This Court, in its opinion, has completely disregarded its duty, as enunciated in its prior decisions, to
give credence and dignity to the trial court's :findings.
This Court has repeatedly held that on appeal, it must
strongly consider the trial court's opportunity to see,
hear and appraise the witnesses as they testify. Particularly is this rule applicable where the evidence consists
primarily of the oral testimony of the witnesses.
The more recent cases and some of the statements
of this Court setting forth this rule are cited below:
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Walton·v. Koffman, 110 Utah 1. The Court states:
"As above stated, this is an equity case,
(cases cited). It is, therefore, our duty to carefully
examine the record and make an independent
determination of what the facts are. In so doing,
we should keep in mind that the trial judge saw
and heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor and was acquainted with the circumstances surrounding the giving· of their testimony,
and, therefore, was in a better position than we
are to weigh and evaluate their evidence. (cites
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe in
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 527, 94 P. 2d 465)."
I quote from said concurring opinion :
"In short, as held in Wilcox v. Cloward, 88
Utah 503, 56 P. 2d 1, if after we review the record
we can not say that the court came to a wrong
conclusion, we should affirm. We do not reverse
if we find the court's findings supported by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, or if supported
only by a slight preponderance or if the evidence
is evenly balanced, or even if there is in the record
a slight preponderance the other way, for the
reasons above set out."
The reasons above set out are in part as follows:
"Our duty is to make an independent examination of the record. If after that, we find (1)
the preponderance of the evidence supports the
trial court's findings of fact; or, (2) if there is
doubt in our 1ninds as to "\Yhere the preponderance
lies, or ( 3) we think the evidence as revealed by
the record n1a~T slightly preponderate against its
conclusions but snrh preponderance may well be
offset in favor of his conclusions by having seen
the witnesses and been able to judge by their
demeanor as to their credibility, then we will not
reverse... "
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In Nokes v. Contznental Mining and MiUing Cornpany, 6 Utah 2d 177, 178, this court, through Justice

Crockett, states the following:
"[1, 2] This being a case in equity, it is our
responsibility to review the evidence. In doing
so it is well to have in mind the general pattern
as to the scope of such review as set out in prior
adjudications in this court. Where there is a
conflict in the evidence, -the finding of the trial
court will not be disturbed if the evidence preponderates in favor of the finding; nor, if the
evidence therein is evenly balanced or it is doubtful where the preponderance lies; nor, even if its
weight is slightly against the finding of the trial
court, but it will be overturned and another
finding made only if the evidence clearly preponderates against his finding.
"[3] The rule just stated is based upon the
sound reasoning that some credit should be indulged in favor of the findings of the trial court
because of the advantages peculiar to his position
in immediate contact with the trial. It is indeed
often true that, 'the manner hath more eloquence
than naked words portend.' There are intangibles
of expression and attitude which give color and
meaning not apparent from words alone. The trial
judge feels the impact of the personalities of the
parties and the witnesses : He is able to observe
their appearance and behavior; their forthrightness or hesitancy in answering; their frankness
and candor, or lack of it. Similarly revealing to
him are indications of surprise, anger, resentment
or vindictiveness, pleasure or other emotions
which may be discerned from expressions of the
countenance or voice. He also has some advantage
in appraising their abilities to understand and
their capacities to remember. Furthermore, he is
in a position to question the witness himself to
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clarify doubtful points or verify his impressions
on the matters just mentioned. All of this combines to afford him better insight as to the truthfulness of the testimony offered than does a
perusal of the cold record. It is a sound and well
recognized policy of the law to repose some confidence in the verity of the actions of the trial
court, and not to interfere with them unless it
clearly appears that he is in error."
Again, in a more recent case, Child v. Child, 8 Utah
2d 261, 332 P. 2d 981, this court again, through Justice
Crockett, says :
"[2] Passing upon the credibility of witnesses
involves to some extent the judgment of what
goes on in the minds of others and is therefore
fraught with uncertainty. Whether one believes a
witness is telling the truth often depends as much
or more upon the impression the witness is making
as upon the words he says. His appearance and
demeanor, his manner of expression and tone of
voice, his apparent frankness, or candor, or the
want of it; his forthrightness in answering, or
his tendency to hesitate or evade, and in fact his
whole personality go into the composite effect of
the testimony. This is so even though the hearer
may not be paying particular attention to nor
separately evaluating such factors. In addition to
the personality aspects involved in the interpretation and evaluation of testimony, there are also
difficulties to be encountered because of the uncertainties found in fact situations themselves
which must be correlated to the testimony of the
witnesses. We have heretofore pointed out the
trial court's advantages in judging the credibility
of witnesses and determining the facts. It is du~
to these considerations that it is firmlY established
that passing on such 1natters is exclu~ively within
his province ... "
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" . . . [6-8] It is not required that the trial
judge's view of the evidence be that which the
justices, or any particular justice, of this court
would have taken of it. There is the practical
necessity of making allowance for his advantaged
position and indulging some latitude for his personal reactions and reasoning with respect thereto,
even though they may not fit the exact pattern
of our own. In reviewing the appraisal he make:S
we can only apply the standard of reasonablenes~,
as it appears to us: this entails application of a
rule that is admittedly, but necessarily, not as
precise as might be desired: if the evidence in
favor of his finding appears to be such that
reasonable minds acting fairly, reasonably and
in good conscience could regard it as being clear
and convincing, as the ordinary meaning of those
words imply, the finding should not be disturbed.
Inasmuch as the burden rests upon the defendants
to demonstrate that the trial court was in error,
the findings and judgment should not be disturbed
unless we can say affirmatively, and with some
degree of assurance, that there is no reasonable
basis in the evidence upon which he could fairly
and rationally have thought that the requisite
degree of proof, i.e., by clear and convincing evidence, was met... "
Our case is a most graphic example of the necessity
for strict adherence to this rule. Here all of the material
evidence concerning fraud, the execution of the questioned deed, etc., is by oral testimony. Mr. Duncan, the
attorney, Mr. Lefler, the banker, Leoda Dunham, one
of the defendants, and George Dunham, the other defendant, all testified. The trial court heard and observed
these witnesss as they testified and chose to believe the
first three witnesses, giving little weight or emphasis tc
the testimony of George Dunham. The trial court ob-
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served the demeanor of the defendant, George Dunham,
and the many statements wherein he was vague or could
not remember details (R. 15-17). The following portions
of the record are fairly representative of the situation
presented to the trial court as Mr. Dunham testified:
Record, Page 19 :

"

. A. I am sixty-two, Your Honor. I'm not
trying to foul up the court, Your Honor.
Since that accident I don't remember some
of these things, Your Honor. I'm not trying
to foul up anything.
"THE COURT: You were hurt yourself?

"A. I was hurt, and I have a blood clot, and in
the summertime it knocks - looks at my
hands, broken, every time I fall. I can't help
it. I just don't remember those things... "
Record, Page 28 :
"THE COURT: Now, let me interrupt
enough to say this, that I don't believe this
witness's memory according to him is sufficient to hold Mr. Duncan longer. If you wish
to put Mr. Duncan on the stand, you may
withdraw this witness to put him on..."
Record, Page 138 :

" ... Q. In the management of the property up
there, just what specifically has George done
throughout the years?
"A. George helps out with a little repair work.
He sells a few bottles of beer. He isn't able
to do 1nuch. He was so badly crippled that
he's not been able to do much, and he was
sick before that with a heart condition.
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"Q. When you say 'crippled,' in what way is he
crippled~

"A. Well, his hip is completely gone, and his left
arm is completely demolished, and he had
all of his jaws broken, jaws broken on both
sides of his face, and nearly every bone in
the body, I suppose the greater majority was
broken.

"Q. And when did this happen~
"A.

That was on November 8, 1953..."

Record, Page 51 :
" ... THE COURT: I have a question,
sir. Wer~ you in the hospital after you were
in an accident~
"A. Yes Sir.
"THE COURT:
the
"A.

How long were you in

hospital~

Oh, off and on for three and a half years ... "

The foregoing excerpts from the record do not show
a witness upon which this Court should rely - whose
testimony could be considered "clear and convincing"
evidence that the deed was not executed. Nor can he be
deemed reliable, when, within two months after trial,
he shot Leoda Dunham, her mother and brother at Camp
Killkare and is now committed to the State Mental
Hospital. The trial court did not think the testimony
was reliable and counsel for defendants did not think
so and did not call Mr. Dunham as a witness nor crossexamine him. Mr. Dunham's disabilities are apparent to
all who observe him in his actions and speech.
This Court apparently ignores these matters and
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places great emphasis on the statement of George Dunham, "it could very well be." At Page 3 in the first full
paragraph, the opinion states in part:
" ... Then in answer to the question: ' ... Isn't
it true that Mr. Duncan brought this (the deed)
to you in November of 1953, when you were in the
Veterans' Hospital after the accident that you
had when you injured yourself and Mr. Sizemore
and l\1r. Garrett~ ... Isn't that the place and the
time that you signed this document .. ~' He said:
'It could very well be.'
The Court relies upon this statement even though
in the testimony imn1ediately preceding and immediately
after said statement, Mr. Dunham states that he doeB
not know where or when he signed the deed.
A more patent disregard of the trial court's appraisal of the witnesses would be difficult to find. Since
there is no review of this court's findings, other than
by this Petition for Rehearing, it is equitable and in
harmony with this Court's prior rulings to follow the
trial court's appraisal of the individual characteristics
of the witnesses and the manner in which they testified.
This Court makes inference after inference of fraud
based upon portions of the testin1ony which it finds inconsistent or which it believes is questionable because
of the veracity of the witnesses. All of these inferences
are contrary to the trial court's findings and nowhere is
~ny consideration gi,~en to the trial court's more favorable
opportunity to observe the witnesses. Smne of the more
obvious of these instances are hereinafter n1entioned:
(a) In paragraph 1, page 2 of the Opinion, the
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Court relies upon the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Dunharn,
indicating the income each was making. At the same
time, testimony of these witnesses indicating that Leoda
purchased the property while George drank up his wages,
was completely rejected. This later is the only testimony
to show how the property was purchased and this Court
gives it no weight. (R. 24, 60)
(b) In paragraph 2, page 2 of the Opinion, the
Court recites that various deeds and mortgages were
executed by both George and Leoda Dunham, that the
sales of the properties were largely negotiated by him
and that he never suggested to any of the purchasers
that Leoda was the owner of the property. The Court
then concludes that these actions indicated George was
at least an equal owner with Leoda in the property. The
Court makes this conclusion notwithstanding the extensive testimony of both Leoda Dunham and Tom Lefler
indicating that Leoda was the person who handled the
property, that George was given the right to negotiate
in some instances, that the record title required the
execution of the deeds and mortgages by both George
and Leoda. (R. 66, 72, 75) All of this testimony by Leoda
Dunham and by Mr. Lefler is completely rejected apparently upon the basis that the witnesses' credibility is
challenged by this Court. There is no other evidence
controverting this testimony.
(c) In paragraph 2, page 3 of the Opinion, the
Court sets forth as a "doubtful circumstance" the inference that since all of the deeds and mortgages, other
than the deed in question, were drawn by the bank's
officers, the deed in question was not executed prior to
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the accident. Again, this Court has completely rejected
the testimony appearing at Pages 89, 94, 95 and 139 of
the record, wherein Leoda Dunham and Mr. Lefler, in
great detail, explain that all of the money went to pay
the mortgage at the bank because of assignments it held
and that the bank prepared all of the various documents,
having a substantial interest in the closing of each
transaction. It certainly is more reasonable to accept
such testimony than to ignore it or to infer from it the
commission of acts of fraud.
(d) In paragraph 2, page 3 of the Opinion, this
Court points to the statement of Mr. Layton as having
little weight as evidence that the deed was made prior
to the accident.
The Court, however, fails to mention Mr. Layton's
statement that these conversations occurred about a year
before the accident (R. 150) and appears to ignore the
inconsistencies existing in his testimony which led the
trial court to eliminate this evidence from its consideration. (R. 155)
(e) In the last paragraph on page 3 of the Opinion,
the Court concludes that half of the property is George's.
There is no evidence that George owned half of the
property or any specific portion of the property and
such conclusion is 1nanifestly unsupported by the evidence.
POINT III.
THE ,COURT HAS FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS FINDINGS
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

If we now look at the recital of facts and inferences
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therefrom made by this Court, there is no clear and
convincing evidence that the deed was not executed on
the date it bears, that Leoda Dunham and her husband
George fraudulently placed the property in Leoda's
name and that George now owns one-half of the property.
The evidence which this Court has found as a basis
for determining that the deed was not executed November
1, 1952, is shown hereafter:
(a) The most important point relied upon by the
Court and concerning Leoda Dunham's understanding of
joint tenancy (4th para. pg. 2 of Opinion) is disposed
of under Point I above.
(b) The next point being Mr. Dunham's statement,
"it could very well be" (para. 1, pg. 3 of Opinion), in
view of the uncertainty of his testimony and of the
nature of his personality can hardly be termed as "clear
and convincing evidence."
(c) The fact that Dunhams went to Mr. Duncan
and not to the bank (para. 2, pg. 3 of Opinion) shows
no fraud nor anything to indicate the deed was not
executed that day. The Kirkpatrick to Dunham deed was
prepared by Harlan Clark in January of 1951. The
George to Leoda deed on November 1, 1952, was the first
transaction thereafter relating to the property. It was
natural for the Dunhams to again go to an attorney,
since this deed had nothing to do with the bank, with any
assignment of monies from the sale of the property:
nor with any releases of mortgage.
(d) .It certainly is consistent for the Dunhams to
both say that they did not discuss joint tenancy with Mr.
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Duncan (para. 2, pg. 3 of Opinion) and for Mr. Duncan
to say that joint tenancy was not discussed, but that it
wouldn't make any difference anyway since he did not
believe in joint tenancy. These statements show nothing
with reference to the execution of the deed.
(e) Mr. Duncan said he probably (R. 40) told the
Dunhams to record the deed (para. 2, pg. 3 of Opinion),
but Mrs. Dunham did not do so for over a year. Clear
and convincing evidence should not be predicated upon
such indefiniteness as the phrase "probably told," as
testified to by Mr. Duncan. One has only to see and hear
Mrs. Dunham to realize her homespun and unassuming
personality, and to believe that she was sincere in saying
that she did not record the document because she was
busy and did not realize it had to be recorded. (R. 72)
The Court recognizes (para. 2, pg. 3 of Opinion)
that none of these incidents singly were strong proof
that the deed was not exeucted. Certainly putting these
three fact incidents together, do not make any more
clear and convincing, the claim of fraud.
"Two other claims in favor of the Dunhams" (para.
3, pg. 3 of Opinion) are apparently not relied upon as
proof of the fraud, but merely to show weakness in the
defendants' proof. Neither of these two points add much
to plaintiff's case. The actions of ~Ir. Lefler are certainly
reasonabl~r explained at great length (R. 97, 98, 100, 101,
105) and the statements of 1\Ir. Layton admittedly add
nothing to the case. However, the v-ery inclusion of these
two points in this opinion indicate the Court's reliance
to smne extent in making inferences from the facts
therein set forth.
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Therefore, paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) above
include all of the evidence stated by this Court to show
a case of fraud, supposedly by clear and convincing
evidence. In the case of Child v. Child, supra, recently
decided by this Court, is a clear and extensive definition
of the "clear and convincing evidence" rule. To reverse
and to make findings in this equity case, as it has now
done, this Court must be convinced that there is no
reasonable basis in the record to support the lower
court's findings that the deed was executed and that there
was no fraud. Such a burden does not appear to have
been sustained in this Court's opinion.
Finally with reference to the finding that George
Dunham owns one-half of the property, there appears
to be no evidence upon which such a finding can be made.
If Leoda and George are sustained in their testimony
concerning payment for the property, then Leoda without
a doubt owns the property in her own name. If the
Court does not believe these witnesses with reference to
the payments made for the property, then there is no
evidence whatsoever to indicate how the property has
been paid for and to further indicate the proportionate
amount of payment borne by each. If a rehearing is not
permitted, the case should nevertheless be remanded for
the lower court to now determine the respective interests
of these defendants.

SUMMARY
Leoda Dunham is the owner and manager of the
property. She is an honest, straight forward, hard
working and sincere wife. George Dunham on the other
hand, as is shown by the testimony and by his commit-
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ment ·to the State Mental Hospital, was physically and
mentally uncertain. One can only form such a contrasting
opinion of these two defendants by seeing them and
talking with them. One has only to see and talk with
Thomas Lefler, the cashier of the bank, to know his sincerity and trustworthiness. This Court, however, is not
able to pass upon these traits of the witnesses, since it
has had no opportunity to observe these witnesses. Notwithstanding this lack of intimate contact so necessary
to a trial court in determining the veracity of witnesses,
this Court has decided that these witnesses testified
falsely. Such a determination, so far removed from the
scene of trial, should be subject to re-examination by this
Court in view of the lack of supporting evidence. Leoda
Dunham, by this opinion, will have one-half of her property and in effect, a substantial, if not entire means
of support taken from her without the opportunity of a
review of these factual determinations by this Court.
It is submitted that in all fairness and under reasonable and equitable principles, this Court should reexamine the evidence and thereupon affirm the trial court
in its findings.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE & :ME·CHAM
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
Attorneys for Defendavnts
and Respondents
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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